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INTRODUCTION 
An article published in early 2014 in a peer-reviewed scientific 
journal began with a startling comment: “The recognition that 
individuals with disabilities have a desire for sexual relationships with 
other people is a relatively new concept in the scientific community.”1 
We believe that this observation—wildly at odds with much of the 
literature referred to in this Article and in another paper by the two 
authors2—exemplifies the discussion in our previous paper about the 
confusion and misinformation that permeates all of disability law and 
policy, especially mental disability law. The baseline, rather, for any 
scholarly inquiry into this subject, must be that “[i]ndividuals [with 
disabilities] have the same needs for intimate relationships and sexual 
expression as everyone else.”3 
With the growth in the field of mental disability law over the past 
forty years, very few topics involving persons with mental illness remain 
1. Laura Gilmour, Veronica Smith & Melike Schalomon, Sexuality and ASD: Current State of the 
Research, in 1 COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO AUTISM 569 (Vinood B. Patel et al. eds., 2014) 
(emphasis added). In this Article, we focus primarily—but not exclusively—on individuals with 
mental disabilities. Many other issues are raised in the context of individuals with physical 
disabilities. See, e.g., Julia Bahner, Legal Rights or Simply Wishes? The Struggle for Sexual 
Recognition of People with Physical Disabilities Using Personal Assistance in Sweden, 30 
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 337, 347 (2012) (discussing “intimacy influenced activities” such as 
genital shaving). By way of example, there has been some preliminary exploration of the question 
of the impact of certain physical disabilities on a woman’s ability to have orgasms. See, e.g., Clive 
Glass, Sexual Problems of Disabled Patients, 171 BRIT. MED. J. 107, 108–09 (1999). 
2. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Love is Just a Four-Letter Word”: 
Sexuality, International Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 CAN. J. COMP. & 
CONTEMP. L. (forthcoming 2014). 
3. Shirli Werner, Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities: A Review of the Literature on 
Decision-Making Since the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 34 PUB. 
HEALTH REV. 1, 16 (2012). Professor Werner’s focus was on persons with intellectual disabilities, 
but there is nothing in the literature that suggests persons with mental illness or psychosocial 
disabilities are any different in this regard. We use the phrase “mental disabilities” to encompass 
both groups. 
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taboo or off limits to scholars and judges who face these issues daily.4 
However, discussions of the question of whether persons with mental 
disabilities have a right to voluntary sexual interaction often touches a 
raw nerve in conversations about mental disability law—even with those 
who are practicing in the field. The discomfort that people feel in 
examining this topic is further exacerbated when discussing individuals 
who are institutionalized. Why is this? And what does this have to do 
with “sanism”—an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character 
as other irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing 
social attitudes such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry5 
that permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all 
participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact finders, 
counsel, and expert and lay witnesses?6 Consider this explanation as to 
how audience members responded to standard talks on this topic: 
If as I saw it, sanist myths, based on stereotypes, are the result of 
rigid categorization and overgeneralization, then they function 
psychologically to “localize our anxiety, to prove to ourselves 
that what we fear does not lie within.”7 
We thus labeled individuals with mental illness as “deviant, morally 
weak, sexually uncontrollable [and] emotionally unstable.”8 And often, 
we (especially professionals) regard them as not being human at all, and 
lacking human qualities including needs for affection and dignified ways 
of expressing affection. Our attitudes toward the sexuality of persons 
4. This taboo even extends to the disability community. See Bahner, supra note 1, at 338. 
5. The word “sanism” was, to the best of our knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See 
Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development, in MEDICAL, 
MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 105 (Frank Ayd ed., 1974); see also Koe v. 
Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978). One of the authors has relied on the term 
constantly for the past twenty–five years to explain the roots of our attitudes towards persons with 
mental disabilities. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, 
Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999) (discussing how sanism permeates all mental disability law). See infra text 
accompanying notes 61–68. 
6. On the way that sanism affects lawyers’ representation of clients, see Michael L. Perlin, “You 
Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 689–
90 (2003). 
7. See Michael L. Perlin, “Limited in Sex, They Dare”: Attitudes Toward Issues of Patient 
Sexuality, 26 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 25, 31 (2005) (quoting SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE 
AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE, AND MADNESS 240 (1985)). The audience 
members included some lay persons, but were mostly comprised of mental health professionals—
psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses—and personnel such as occupational therapists and physical 
therapists. Many of the responses to presentations discussed in this article were at hospital Grand 
Rounds talks. 
8. Michael L. Perlin, On Sanism, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 393 (1992). 
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with mental disabilities reflect this labeling: 
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs 
of the mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as 
possessing an animalistic hypersexuality, which warrants the 
imposition of special protections and limitations on their sexual 
behavior to stop them from acting on these “primitive” urges. 
By focusing on alleged “differentness,” we deny their basic 
humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual 
needs. By asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow 
ourselves to censor their feelings and their actions. By denying 
their ability to show love and affection, we justify this disparate 
treatment.9 
All these tensions are heightened in cases involving institutionalized 
persons, in which consumer desires and provider discomforts must be 
acknowledged and recalibrated.10 They must also be considered 
carefully in the context of Professor Suzanne Doyle’s observation that 
sex is an “indeterminate and artificial” category defined “by people who 
want to preserve their own political and social advantages.”11 
It is also telling as to how uncomfortable this topic makes many 
people when we consider the responses of audience members to frank 
discussions about these issues (at a talk in Florida, one attendee leapt to 
his feet to exclaim, “Professor Perlin, you are an agent of the devil!”);12 
negative responses could be broken down into these categories: 
1. Anger; 
2. Denial; 
3. Projection; 
4. Transference; 
9. Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last 
Frontier?, 20 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 537 (1993–94). For a subsequent consideration of 
the impact of this infantilization, see generally Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, Hearing the Sexual 
Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues, 52 
MCGILL L.J. 515 (2007). 
10. See, e.g., Julie Tennille & Eric Wright, Addressing the Intimacy Interests of People with 
Mental Health Conditions: Acknowledging Consumer Desires, Provider Discomforts, and System 
Denial, THE TEMPLE UNIVERSITY COLLABORATIVE ON COMMUNITY INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS 
WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 8 (Apr. 2013), http://tucollaborative.org/pdfs/Toolkits_ 
Monographs_Guidebooks/relationships_family_friends_intimacy/intimacy.pdf. On the importance 
of intimacy to persons with disabilities, see Bahner, supra note 1, at 344–45. 
11. Suzanne Doyle, The Notion of Consent to Sexual Activity for Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 31 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 111, 133 (2010) (citing TOBIN SIEBERS, DISABILITY THEORY 73 
(1998)). 
12. Perlin, supra note 7, at 35. On how inquiries in this area have traditionally been “blocked,” 
see David John Frank & Nolan Edward Phillips, Sex Laws and Sexuality Rights in Comparative and 
Global Perspectives, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 249, 250 (2013).  
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5. Fear; 
6. Religiosity.13 
Audience responses—whether the audiences were composed of 
lawyers, physicians, mental health professionals, advocates, family 
members or lay persons—have been similar in other nations, both 
common law (the United Kingdom) and civil law (Japan).14 Again, these 
attitudes deny the empirical realities to which we have referred.15 
Although this often appears to be a difficult subject to raise, even 
among those familiar and comfortable with other aspects of mental 
disability, it is one that must be raised. Dignity concerns and rights 
violations will occur if there is not a full understanding of the 
importance of the ability for persons with mental illness to practice free 
sexual expression. There has been some literature that begins to discuss 
this and to delve into the intricacies of the subject. However, we believe 
that much of this literature presumes that the “subjects” of these 
papers—those with mental illness who are institutionalized—are 
incompetent. The discussions therefore only address ability to engage in 
sexual activities from the perspective of an incompetent, 
institutionalized adult. We hope to broaden the scope of these 
examinations, and rather than presume incompetency, deal directly with 
the very likely situation of a competent, mentally ill person wishing to 
engage in sexual activity. We hope to examine legal competency, as well 
as the difficulties encountered when one begins to use different measures 
of “competency” for different tasks or activities. We will also explore 
13. Perlin, supra note 7, at 34–35. Eddie McCann has speculated that this may be because of a 
fear that simply addressing this issue “will be seen as actively encouraging widespread institutional 
promiscuity.” Eddie McCann, The Expression of Sexuality in Persons with Psychosis: Breaking the 
Taboos, 32 J. ADVANCED NURSING 132, 133 (2000). 
14. For attitudes in Asia, see generally Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else 
Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of 
Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2008). In a subsequent 
paper, the authors will explore the cognitive dissonance in the laws of Asian nations that 
demonstrate “how complicated and messy it can be for a foreign law from the distant past to be 
brought into congruence with contemporary and evolving societal norms.” See George Baylon 
Radics, Decolonizing Singapore’s Sex Laws: Tracing Section 377a of Singapore’s Penal Code, 45 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 99 (2013) (considering the parallel question of the current status of 
Singapore’s criminalization of consensual sodomy). On comparative perspectives in general, see 
Frank & Phillips, supra note 12. 
15. See Werner, supra note 3, at 16 (citing Mona Eklund & Margareta Ostman, Belonging and 
Doing: Important Factors for Satisfaction with Sexual Relations as Perceived by People with 
Persistent Mental Illness, 56 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 336 (2010)); Martin Lyden, Assessment of 
Sexual Consent Capacity, 25 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 3 (2007); Eileen Dukes & Brian E. 
McGuire, Enhancing Capacity to Make Sexuality-Related Decisions in People with an Intellectual 
Disability, 53 J. INTELLECTUAL & DISABILITY RES. 727 (2009). 
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the attitudes that surround this type of discourse, and their impact on 
advancing the rights of persons with mental illness. 
In this Article, we consider these attitudes while seeking to answer the 
following questions: 
• In this area of law and policy, is there any unitary definition 
of competence? 
• Are there certain factors that must be considered in 
determining “sexual competence”? 
• How does domestic law and policy relate to issues of sexual 
competence, and does it impact how we should approach 
these issues? 
• What are the international human rights law and therapeutic 
jurisprudence implications of the answers to these questions? 
In Part I, we will discuss competence to engage in sexual activity in 
matters involving persons with mental disabilities, looking also at the 
question of what we mean when we refer to “sex.” We then consider in 
Part II the significance of sanism, the potential implications of 
international human rights law, and the meaning of therapeutic 
jurisprudence to this inquiry. Then, in Part III, we will discuss issues of 
competency in the context of marriage and, briefly, in the context of 
sterilization. In Part IV, we will look at competency in the context of 
criminal law, focusing mostly on the ways that “statutory rape” is 
defined in cases with putatively consensual sex involving persons with 
mental disabilities. We will examine in Part V the maturation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act as a litigation tool. We will then 
conclude with a few thoughts and recommendations. 
Our title comes, in part, from Bob Dylan’s magnificent song, 
Desolation Row (from the line: “But all his sexless patients/They’re 
trying to blow it up”).16 The music and social critic Mike Marqusee 
characterizes Desolation Row as “a brutal vision of persecution in which 
social control is depicted as a form of torture.”17 We exercise such 
“social control” over those institutionalized because of mental disability, 
and we ultimately can see that the suppression of all sexual desire and 
action is, in fact, a form of social torture. 
16. Bob Dylan, Desolation Row, BOBDYLAN.COM, http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/ 
desolation-row (last visited May 5, 2014). 
17. MIKE MARQUSEE, CHIMES OF FREEDOM: THE POLITICS OF BOB DYLAN’S ART 192 (2003).  
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I. COMPETENCE TO HAVE SEX 
A. Factors to Consider in Assessing Competence to Have Sex 
We must start with the assumption that all individuals have the 
capacity to consent to sexual relations, and that the presence of a mental 
disorder, in itself, does not mean that the individual lacks this capacity.18 
With this as a “given,” for the purposes of this article, it is first necessary 
to unpack the different modes of analysis to be engaged in determining 
capacity and competency, and understanding the important distinctions 
between the two concepts. Capacity “refers to an individual’s actual 
ability to understand, appreciate, and form a relatively rational intention 
with regard to some act.”19 Competency is a legal assessment that varies 
based on the act or decision making that is being considered.20 Most 
famously, in Godinez v. Moran,21 the Supreme Court imposed a unitary 
standard of competency in criminal cases,22 holding the competency to 
waive counsel or to plead guilty was to be assessed by the same standard 
as competency to stand trial.23 Justice Harry Blackmun in dissenting 
noted archly, “A person who is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not 
thereby ‘competent’ to play the violin . . . Competency for one purpose 
does not necessarily translate to competency for another purpose.”24 
18. See MENTAL WELFARE COMMISSION OF SCOTLAND, CONSENTING ADULTS? GUIDANCE FOR 
PROFESSIONALS AND CAREERS WHEN CONSIDERING RIGHTS AND RISKS IN SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
INVOLVING PEOPLE WITH A MENTAL DISORDER 4 (2007). See generally Elizabeth Ford, Michele 
Rosenberg, Margarita Holsten & Tyson Boudreaux, Managing Sexual Behavior on Adult Acute 
Care Inpatient Psychiatric Units, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 346 (2003). 
19. Steven B. Bisbing, Competency and Capacity: A Primer, in LEGAL MEDICINE 325, 325 
(Shafeek S. Sanbar ed., 7th ed. 2007). On why inquiries into capacity are an insufficient basis for 
decision-making about persons with mental disabilities engaging in sexual interactions, see Andreas 
Dimopoulos, Let’s Misbehave: Intellectual Disability and Capacity to Consent to Sex 1 (Sept. 1, 
2012) (unpublished paper presented to Society of Legal Scholars), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2332259. 
20. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY 
TO CLINICAL APPLICATION (2008). 
21. 509 U.S. 389 (1993). The Supreme Court subsequently backed off of the rigidity of the 
Godinez holding in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). The Court there held that the right of 
self-representation was not absolute and the State could insist that an attorney be appointed to 
represent a mentally ill defendant even though he had been found competent to stand trial. Id. at 
171, 178. 
22. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402. 
23. Id. at 391.  
24. Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On the need to consider competencies in matters of 
sexuality as a distinct area of inquiry, see Oana Georgiana Girlescu, Sexuality and Disability: An 
Assessment of Practices under the Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 64 (2012) 
(unpublished thesis, Central European University), available at http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2013/ 
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Both of these concepts are intertwined in assessing the extent to 
which a person can exercise informed consent. In the context of this 
Article, such consent encompasses: 
• An individual’s ability to understand the sexual nature of an 
act, and to understand that participation in such an act must 
be voluntary; 
• An individual’s understanding of the potential consequences 
and implications of the decision to engage in a sexual act; and 
• An individual’s ability to communicate a decision as to 
whether he or she wishes to engage in such an activity.25 
There is also the difficulty of establishing “clinical” competency, for 
those persons who are institutionalized. There is no standard that 
clinicians can apply when determining competency; in fact, it is a very 
fluid determination. In a survey of institutions’ views on their ability to 
handle ethical concerns of patient sexual expression, author Eric Wright 
found, “aside from formal legal declarations of incompetence, 
establishing competence to engage in sexual activity during treatment is 
further complicated by the dynamic nature of psychiatric symptoms, 
variation in patients’ sexuality-related knowledge and experience, and 
institutional policies.”26 Moreover, in certain locations, the relationship 
between sexuality and privacy27 is “directly related to assessments 
about . . . competence.”28 
The reality is, however, that we too often fail to take any of this into 
account and instead superimpose a societal presumption of 
incompetency29—a “damaging message[]” when applied to any aspects 
girlescu_oana.pdf. 
25. Doyle, supra note 11, at 117–18; see also Martin Lyden, Assessment of Sexual Consent 
Capacity, 25 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 3 (2007); Paul Abramson et al., Consenting to Sex and 
Severe Mental Illness: Terra Incognita and a Priest with AIDS, 30 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 357, 
363 (2012). 
26. Eric R. Wright, Institutional Capacity to Respond to the Ethical Challenges of Patient Sexual 
Expression in State Psychiatric Hospitals in the United States, 7 J. ETHICS MENTAL HEALTH 1, 2 
(2012). For a consideration of how institutional living inevitably shapes policies related to 
masturbation, see generally infra text accompanying notes 39–44. See also Michael Gill, Sex Can 
Wait, Masturbate: The Politics of Masturbation, 15 SEXUALITIES 472 (2012). 
27. See infra text accompanying note 41. 
28. Gill, supra note 26, at 476. 
29. On similar incorrect presumptions of incompetency in the law, see, for example, Hillary 
Rodham (Clinton), Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 506 (1973) (presumed 
incompetency in children); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, A Dilemma of Doctrinal Design: Rights, Identity 
and the Work-Family Conflict, 8 FLA. INT’L UNIV. L. REV. 379, 386 (2013) (presumed physical 
incompetency of pregnant teachers). On how lawyers often impermissibly engage in such a 
presumption of incompetency with regard to their institutionalized clients, see Michael L. Perlin, “I 
Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial”: A Global Perspective on the Right 
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of a person with a mental disability.30 This, more than anything else, 
leads to the confusion, dissonance, and tension in this area of law, 
society, and personhood. 
B. Defining “Sex” 
In an earlier article, one of the authors considered the difficulties in 
defining what we mean by “sex”:31 
Finally, we must consider whether any of [our] answers depends 
upon our definition of sex. Do we need to consider every 
possible permutation of sexual behavior? Does it make a 
difference if we are discussing monogamous heterosexual sex, 
polygamous heterosexual sex, monogamous homosexual sex, 
polygamous homosexual sex, or bisexual sex? Does sex mean 
intercourse? What about oral sex? Anal sex? Masturbation? 
Voyeurism? Exhibitionism? Should erotic or pornographic 
material be made available to patients? If so, what sorts—
magazines of the kind often available at convenience stores or 
“hard core” magazines”? What about sexually explicit literature 
that might appear to involve, condone, or encourage violence? 
Should sexually explicit videos or movies be available for 
patients to see? If so, should they view them communally or 
individually? What if a patient’s prehospitalization behavior 
involved significant “sexual acting out” in what had been seen 
as inappropriate ways? Should a patient’s decision to engage in 
what is sometimes perceived as “deviant” sexual behavior 
subsequently be used as evidence of their danger either to self or 
others or of “grave disability”?32 
Defining “sex” is made more complex because, on many levels, 
sexuality is “an identity rather than [simply] an act.”33 The identity, 
to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, and Its Implications for Clinical Legal Education, 28 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 262 (2008). There is no question that not even a judgment of 
involuntary commitment acts as an adjudication of incompetency. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:4–24.2(c) (West 2013). 
30. Eli Best, Atypical Actors and Tort Law’s Expressive Function, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 461, 488 
(2012). 
31. Sexuality must be defined “as wider than just physical function”; this is “particularly 
important for persons with disabilities.” Glass, supra note 1, at 518. 
32. Perlin, supra note 9, at 527. See generally Michael L. Commons, Judi T. Bohn, Lisa T. 
Godon, Mark J. Hauser & Thomas G. Gutheil, Professionals’ Attitudes Towards Sex Between 
Institutionalized Patients, 46 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 571 (1992) (discussing ways that mental 
health professionals’ attitudes towards sex are influenced by the nature of the sexual activity and the 
patients’ sexual orientation).  
33. Frank & Phillips, supra note 12, at 252. 
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which also allows for group membership based on certain preferences, is 
yet another way of distancing those with mental illnesses from society in 
general, where there may be taboos but no complete disallowance of 
certain sexual behaviors. People with mental illnesses may be told, 
directly or indirectly, that their sexual behavior is abnormal or 
unacceptable, especially if those persons are institutionalized. This 
becomes all the more critical of an issue when we acknowledge the 
reality that masturbation, by way of example, is often treated in 
institutions as a behavioral infraction.34 Again, this message to persons 
with mental illness that their sexual activities are in some way 
inappropriate is exacerbated by the omnipresence of false, stereotypical 
beliefs, such as, for example, “people with schizophrenia ‘don’t do 
sex.’”35 
1. Variations36 
Different sexual preferences are common enough among those not 
diagnosed with a mental illness, and while certain prejudices exist 
against particular subcultures that promote a particular sexual activity, 
there continue to be many ways of expressing an individual’s natural 
sexual preferences without facing discrimination or disgust.37 However, 
in the literature dealing with a mentally ill individual’s right to engage in 
sex, the word “sex” is generally used broadly, without much thought as 
to what exactly it is encompassing. We believe it is important to begin 
naming and discussing some of the sexual practices that, while not 
“vanilla” or “mainstream,” are likely to be sought by those with mental 
disabilities.38 
34. Gill, supra note 26, at 479. Professor Gill also speculates that the association between 
masturbation and pornography is one reason why there is so little public discussion about 
masturbation. Id. at 490 n.10. 
35. McCann, supra note 13, at 133. 
36. On the social and cultural factors that surround all aspects of sexuality, see Bahner, supra 
note 1, at 350–51: “[C]ultural sexual scripts influence not only the sexual acts per se but also many 
surrounding factors that may be needed in order to be able to reach desired sexual goals.” There are 
other variations, of course, that we do not address here (e.g., group sex, “rough” sex, phone sex). 
We plan to discuss these in a future article. 
37. See id. at 337. 
38. See id. at 340 (“[T]he heterosexual, non-disabled monogamous couple, belonging to the same 
generation, having ‘vanilla sex’ in their home is still considered the norm.”). See generally Gayle 
Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in CULTURE, SOCIETY 
AND SEXUALITY: A READER 150 (Richard Parker & Peter Aggleton eds., 1984). 
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a. Masturbation39 
Although sexual activity often refers to intercourse where two people 
are involved, one variation of sexual activity is masturbation. While not 
often discussed publicly, society seems to generally accept that people 
masturbate, and it does not have the same kind of taboos associated with 
it as other, less mainstream kinds of sexual acts. In fact, masturbation 
training in sex education “represents one of the few sanctioned 
approaches for individuals with intellectual disabilities.”40 
If masturbation is viewed as an appropriate practice, institutions must 
be prepared to create safe spaces for patients, just as a non-
institutionalized person would be able find his or her own space, to 
privately engage in masturbation. If one is in a facility that denies 
privacy, where can one masturbate in a “safe place”?41 Although sexual 
behaviors of all sorts are seen generally as private matters, it becomes a 
public issue within the context of institutionalization.42 All of this, 
though, is always shrouded in secrecy. As Professor Gill notes, “[t]he 
masturbatory closet remains shut.”43 
Beyond allowing masturbation for patients who are institutionalized, 
there is also a benefit to engaging in masturbation training, particularly 
with individuals who may need sexual health education. Siebers has 
listed four benefits of masturbation training: 
(1) to help patients with mental disabilities understand that 
sexual acts should be private, allowing authorities to eliminate 
offensive behavior from public spaces; (2) [t]o provide patients 
with a means of releasing tension and controlling frustration, 
creating a more passive and manageable population for 
caregivers; (3) [t]o teach safer methods of masturbation to 
patients who are injuring themselves in the pursuit of sexual 
pleasure; and (4) to introduce the pleasures of sexuality as part 
of typical human existence to people for whom these pleasures 
are unknown.44 
Siebers recognizes the therapeutic value of this practice, which is an 
39. See generally Gill, supra note 26, at 477 (“The meaning behind masturbation fluctuates based 
on historical situations.”). 
40. Id. at 472. 
41. See generally Gill, supra note 26. 
42. Id. at 480 (citing Deanna McGaughey & Richard Tewksbury, Masturbation, in PRISON SEX: 
PRACTICE AND POLICY 133, 135 (Christopher Hensley ed., 2002)). 
43. Id. at 477 (citations omitted). 
44. SIEBERS, supra note 11, at 162 (quoting Gill, supra note 26, at 484). 
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important consideration.45 Not only does this training teach appropriate 
behaviors, but it also allows for therapeutic “release” of urges or 
frustrations in a safe way, something that otherwise may never be 
discussed with these patients. 
An extraordinarily controversial question is the appropriateness of 
using care workers as sexual surrogates in cases involving persons with 
disabilities.46 Such surrogacy can involve masturbation or intercourse.47 
Several European nations—including the Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark and Switzerland—allow “limited ‘touching’ services for 
[persons with severe disabilities] through non-profit organisations.”48 In 
fact, in Denmark, it is the care worker’s duty to facilitate service users’ 
sexuality, whether it concerns assistance in order to have sex with a 
partner, to masturbate, or to contact a prostitute.49 
b. Availability of Contraception 
Another issue that must be addressed is the availability of 
contraception for male and female patients. As discussed further below, 
the notion of sexuality is quite gendered, and the same may be true of 
access to contraceptives. Would it be reasonable to provide condoms to 
men and women? Or birth control? Would there ever exist a justification 
for providing one, but not the other?50 
Eric Wright’s study of psychiatric hospitals’ policies regarding patient 
sexuality found that “only a minority of the [psychiatric institutions 
surveyed] had established guidance regarding ‘reproductive health and 
behavior (pregnancies, abortion rights, access to birth control, etc.)’”51 
Formal policies can help to ensure that facilities respect the sexual 
autonomy of their residents and have a protocol for maintaining patient 
health and safety. 
45. See id. at 162–63.  
46. See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 2, at 12–14. 
47. See generally TOUCHING BASE INC., http://www.touchingbase.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 
2014). 
48. Jacob Appel, Sex Rights for the Disabled?, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 152, 153 (2010). 
49. Bahner, supra note 1, at 339. 
50. In at least one New York City hospital, male patients leaving the facility on unsupervised 
community leave are given condoms upon request. Female patients, on the other hand, must have 
their competency (informally) assessed before birth control pills can be prescribed. See Perlin, supra 
note 9, at 541. 
51. Wright, supra note 26, at 3. 
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c. Gender Issues 
A person’s sexuality is often entwined with his or her gender identity. 
This can result in different treatment based on that identity. Issues of 
men’s and women’s sexuality are viewed differently by society, 
especially with regard to the sexual needs of both genders.52 With the 
addition of a mental disability, these issues become even more difficult 
to contend with. 
The types of sexual activities we have discussed above demonstrate 
some of the gender disparities of our society that have also become 
obvious in issues of sexual activity. Masturbation, for example, is 
generally viewed as an activity which men engage in more frequently 
than women, with the thought process of many being that men somehow 
“need” to engage in masturbation, while women choose to without the 
same need.53 
Sexual surrogacy is another instance where gender stereotypes play 
out. The basic stereotype of men somehow needing sex, or needing to 
orgasm, where women only enjoy it but have no greater physiological 
need is apparent in current surrogate situations. Japan’s White Hands, 
for example, provide a service that allows only men to be masturbated. 
When asked about the viability of a similar service for women, the staff 
claims they “haven’t received any requests from them.”54 
Additionally, the gendered availability of this service may also 
demonstrate another difference rooted in basic anatomy. To sexually 
service a male client, a sex surrogate does not need to perform any act of 
penetration in order to allow that client to reach orgasm, whereas for a 
female, the possibility of penetration may be greater, although it is often 
just as feasible for a woman to reach orgasm without penetration. Even 
the seemingly progressive White Hands organization may be 
unconsciously reacting to the differences in services provided for males 
versus females. The questions they raise on their website ask, first, 
“what exactly do we do [for women] . . . and to what end?” and “would 
52. Some scholars argue that sexual release is as much a basic need as the need for sleep or food. 
See Bahner, supra note 1, at 340, (citing Linda R. Mona, Sexual Options for Persons with 
Disabilities, 26 WOMEN & THERAPY 211 (2003)). 
53. In contemporary sex therapy, it has been hypothesized that teaching women how to 
masturbate to orgasm could be an effective way to counter hypoactive sexual desire disorder, which 
indicates low desire for engaging in sexual activities. See Brian Zamboni & Isiaah Crawford, Using 
Masturbation in Sex Therapy: Relationships Between Masturbation, Sexual Desire, and Sexual 
Fantasy, in MASTURBATION AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING SEXUAL HEALTH 124, 138–39 (Edmond 
Coleman & Walter Bockting eds., 2002). 
54. WHITE HANDS, http://www.whitehands.jp/e.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
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this even be considered a care service?”55 This may be a cultural 
difference, but it demonstrates the gender split between this service for 
males being looked at solely as a “care service” while the existence of 
the same needs for women, and whether it constitutes a care service, are 
debatable.56 
Homosexuality also presents a uniquely gendered set of stereotypes 
about males and females. The general public views male and female 
homosexual behavior differently, and issues of consent may also be 
based on gender.57 Further, it may be possible that a facility would only 
allow heterosexual encounters based on bias, or homosexual activity 
between females and not males. These issues of gender-based 
discrimination of sexual activities must be taken into account when an 
institution works to determine how to appropriately allow for consensual 
sexual encounters between patients. 
d. How This All Relates to Competency 
The many variations of sexual activity between consenting adults 
must be considered in the same way that “basic” heterosexual sex is 
considered. Competence to engage in sexual activity should never be 
prefaced on the type of activity an individual wishes to engage in, no 
matter how taboo. An ongoing difficulty in this area is ensuring that all 
these forms of expression, plus others not covered here, have the same 
standards of competence applied to them. Elaine Craig writes, 
“[u]navoidably, a law that denies capacity to consent to a particular 
sexual act also affects individual liberty. A legal rule that denies capacity 
to consent to a particular sexual act circumscribes sexual liberty by 
depriving individuals of the ability to legally engage in sex that they 
might desire.”58 Craig highlights a key point: sexual activities that fall 
outside the “mainstream” deserve equal treatment in facilities, and the 
55. Id. 
56. Bahner, supra note 1, at 349. Bahner discusses some of the ambivalences faced by persons 
with physical disabilities with regard to the role of their caregiver: 
When discussing sexual facilitation, none of the participants in this study wished their 
assistants to assist more than to the most basic degree, e.g. undressing, putting in position, 
putting on a porn movie, putting on condoms or assisting with other aids. Hence, participants 
drew the line between receiving assistance in order to be able to be sexual on your own or with 
partner(s) and receiving assistance in the actual sexual activity, which was thought of as 
crossing the line. 
Id. 
57. See generally Lisa Gotell, Governing Heterosexuality Through Specific Consent: 
Interrogating the Government Effects of R v. J.A., 24 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 359 (2012). 
58. Elaine Craig, Capacity to Consent to Sexual Risk, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 103, 105 (2014). 
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desire to engage in such acts must be recognized by these facilities as 
being an equally valid sexual desire. Particularly in institutions where 
individual provider’s religious, ethical, or moral beliefs may come into 
play,59 patients must be evaluated equally—regardless of how they 
choose to express themselves sexually or with what subculture they 
identify. Unique characteristics and sexual preferences of an individual 
will not make that individual “less competent” to engage in his or her 
preferred type of sexual activity, even if it means that such individuals 
are not consenting in a traditional way but still desire and understand the 
sexual activity.60 
Just as a person with a mental disability is entitled to individualized 
treatment, his or her sexual ability and interests should be viewed as 
unique characteristics that merit an individual plan and attention. 
Implementing a universal plan for patients in a facility or in the 
community outlining a standard measure of acceptable activities and 
consent will not allow an individual with mental illness to gain pleasure 
from desired sexual activities. This ability to gain pleasure from sexual 
activities that appeal to an individual is something that, with few 
exceptions, society at large is able to do. 
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL INQUIRIES 
A. Introduction 
We now turn to three jurisprudential considerations that, we hope, 
will give greater depth to this inquiry: the meaning of sanism (and 
pretextuality), the significance of international human rights law, and the 
importance of therapeutic jurisprudence to this topic. 
59. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 526. (“Even if policies are promulgated that protect and respect 
the sexual autonomy of institutionalized individuals, what happens when individual line staff at a 
hospital, the people to whom the implementation of the policy inevitably falls, simply refuse to 
cooperate with the policy because their own sense of religious ‘morality’ forbids it?”); see also 
Bahner, supra note 1, at 338 (“Personal assistants’ beliefs and moral judgments have been shown to 
strongly influence, and cause attitudinal barriers in, sexual expression.”). 
60. For example, a sadomasochistic sexual encounter may appear to be a “struggle,” rather than 
“traditional” sex in which both parties outwardly appear to enjoy the activity. However, there is still 
clear consent and safeguards, including a safeword to ensure that either party can stop the activity at 
any time. The sexual fulfillment is created by the appearance of these power dynamics during the 
encounter, but in no way distorts the fact that clear consent has been given. See generally Patricia A. 
Cross & Kim Matheson, Understanding Sadomasochism: An Empirical Examination of Four 
Perspectives, 50 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 133 (2006).  
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1. Sanism 
Sanism’s corrosive effects have warped mental disability law 
jurisprudence.61 Along with pretextuality,62 it has controlled, and 
continues to control, modern mental disability law.63 A careful 
examination of mental disability law reveals that judges are often 
pretextual because of their own “instrumental, functional, normative and 
philosophical” dissatisfaction with non-sanist constitutional decisions 
that grant a measure of dignity to persons with mental disabilities.64 
Indeed, deprivation of dignity is often a reflection of sanism on the part 
of governments and private decision makers.65 
Sanist myths exert especially great power over lawyers who represent 
persons with mental disabilities. The use of stereotypes, typification, and 
de-individualization inevitably means that sanist lawyers will trivialize 
both their clients’ problems and the importance of any eventual solution 
to these problems. Sanist lawyers implicitly and explicitly question their 
clients’ competence and credibility, a move that significantly impairs the 
lawyers’ advocacy efforts.66 
61. See Perlin, supra note 14, at 487. 
62. We define pretexuality as the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) 
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-
making. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil 
Rights in Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2009).  
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in the testimony of forensic 
experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-finders. Experts frequently testify in 
accordance with their own self-referential concepts of “morality” and openly subvert statutory 
and case law criteria that impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment 
or that articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompetency to stand trial 
finding. Often this testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses—like the 
rest of us—succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking, 
and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution theory in their 
testimony. 
Perlin, supra note 5, at 18. 
63. See Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a 
Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 31 (2012). 
64. Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. 
REV. 315, 344 (2003) (quoting Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success Like Failure/and Failure’s 
No Success at All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 
1258 (1997)). 
65. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL 
DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD (2011); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN 
PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000); Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the 
Intersection Between International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, 
in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191 (Bruce A. 
Arrigo & Heather Y. Bersot, eds., 2013). 
66. Perlin, supra note 6, at 684; see also Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the 
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The relationship between sanism and dignity must be underscored.67 
Sanist judicial decisions in cases involving persons with mental 
disabilities in the full range of sexuality matters rob such individuals of 
the basic dignity to which they are entitled.68 
2. International Human Rights69 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
“is regarded as having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ 
to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national 
affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty 
recognition and protection.”70 This Convention is the most revolutionary 
international human rights document ever applied to persons with 
disabilities.71 The CRPD furthers the human rights approach to disability 
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in almost 
every aspect of life.72 It firmly endorses a social model of disability—a 
clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was 
Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine”: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339 (2000). 
67. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (2013). 
68. On the relationship between dignity and “human worth,” see Amanda Ploch, Why Dignity 
Matters: Dignity and the Right (or Not) to Rehabilitation from International and National 
Perspectives, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 887, 895–96 (2012). 
69. Portions of this section are adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and 
Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Future 
of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159, 1173–74 (2013). 
70. Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (footnote omitted). See, 
e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Special Event, U.N. Human Rights 
Council (Mar. 26, 2007) (statements of Louise Arbour, High Comm’r for Human Rights & 
Ambassador Don Mackay, permanent representative of New Zealand and chair of the ad-hoc 
committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities), available at http://bit.ly/TzETzv; 
see also Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter sometimes CRPD]. See generally Kristin Booth Glen, 
Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 134–37 (2012).  
71. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: 
Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, 
PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 80–94 (Michael Dudley et al. eds., 2012); PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED 
ARE HEARD, supra note 65, at 3–21.  
72. See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental 
Disability: The Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 181, 199 (2005). 
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part-and-parcel of mental disability law.73 “The Convention responds to 
traditional models, situates disability within a social model framework, 
and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human 
beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with 
disabilities.”74 It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health 
laws “fully recognise the rights of those with mental illness.”75 There is 
no question that it has “ushered in a new era of disability rights 
policy.”76 
This Convention demands we reconsider the issues discussed in this 
Article.77 In light of Convention Articles mandating, inter alia, “respect 
for inherent dignity,”78 the elimination of discrimination in all matters 
related to interpersonal relationships,79 and services in the area of sexual 
and reproductive health,80 it is time for a radical change of perspective 
and attitude in how society views the sexuality, and right to express that 
sexuality, of persons with disabilities. Society as a whole must, as 
international law already has, recognize that “[b]eing deemed a ‘person’ 
or sexual is not contingent upon ability.”81 Yet, the literature 
surrounding the sexual autonomy and issues of sexuality people with 
disabilities continue to confront remains remarkably silent on this issue 
73. See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned Love”: The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the 
Intersection Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 121 (2011). 
74. Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to 
Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 249, 256 (2009). For additional 
research on how the CRPD fits within a social framework, see Janet E. Lord, David Suozzi & Allyn 
L. Taylor, Lessons from the Experience of U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 564, 568 (2010); H. Archibald Kaiser, Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of 
Redirecting the Ship of State, 17 HEALTH L.J. 139, 164 (2009); Ronald McCallum, The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflections (Sydney Law Sch. 
Research Paper No. 10/30, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1563883. 
75. Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 LAW IN 
CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008).  
76. Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2011). 
77. See generally Perlin & Lynch, supra note 2. 
78. CRPD, supra note 70, at art. 3(a). On how dignity is the first “fundamental axiom” upon 
which the CRPD is premised, see Raymond Lang, The United Nations Convention on the Right and 
Dignities for Persons with Disabilities: A Panacea for Ending Disability Discrimination?, 3 EUR. J. 
DISABILITY 266, 273 (2009).  
79. See CRPD, supra note 70, at art. 23. 
80. Id. at art. 25. 
81. Bethany Stevens, Structural Barriers to Sexual Autonomy for Disabled People, 38 HUM. RTS. 
14 (2011); Girlescu, supra note 24, at 16. 
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in general,82 and totally silent about the rights to sexual autonomy for 
persons institutionalized because of psychosocial or intellectual 
disability.83 
Professors Michael Stein and Janet Lord have written eloquently 
about how another Article in the convention—Article 30, setting out 
social rights of participation in cultural life—”serves as a vital channel 
of engagement with society when such participation is embraced by the 
community,” and increases “self-reliance and empowerment.”84 If the 
Convention is taken seriously—if it is, in fact, more than a “paper 
victor[y]”85—then perhaps it can be a vehicle to uproot that aspect of 
sanism that continues to deny the sexuality rights of institutionalized 
persons with mental disabilities.86 
82. On how the entire question is often seen as “taboo,” see, for example, Michael L. Perlin, 
“Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 947, 965 (1997) (“The taboo and stigma attached to sexual behavior is inevitably 
heightened when it is coupled with and conflated with stereotypes of the meaning of mental 
disability.”). For a clinical perspective, see, for example, McCann, supra note 13. On how the 
controversy over masturbation reflects social taboos, see Gill, supra note 26, at 482. 
83. Special issues may be raised in cases of individuals with autism or those with autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD). Compare Gilmour, Smith & Schalomon, supra note 1 (stating that most 
people with ASD have sexual interests and engage in sexual behaviors with others), with Laura 
Gilmour, Melike Schalomon & Veronica Smith, Sexuality in a Community Based Sample of Adults 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 5 RES. IN AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 313 (2012) (arguing that 
although individuals with ASD display an interest in sex and engage in sexual behaviors and 
showed no significant differences in breadth and strength of sexual behaviors and comprehension of 
sexual language when contrasted with non-ASD participants, nonetheless, a higher rate of 
asexuality was found among individuals with ASD). For a recent consideration of asexuality as a 
category of legal analysis, see generally Elizabeth Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
303 (2014). See also Gill, supra note 26, at 487 (discussing individuals who may wish to choose an 
asexual lifestyle). 
84. Michael Ashley Stein & Janet Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 167, 182 (2008) 
(discussed extensively in Michael L. Perlin, “Through the Wild Cathedral Evening”: Barriers, 
Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, Professor tenBroek, and the Rights of Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 413 (2008)). 
85. Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good is Bad, What’s Bad is Good, You’ll Find Out When You 
Reach the Top You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. 
L.C.) Anything More Than “Idiot Wind?”, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 246 (2002) (“Mental 
disability law is strewn with examples of ‘paper victories.’” (quoting Michael Lottman, Paper 
Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie J. Bradley & 
Gary J. Clarke eds., 1976))). In the specific context of United Nations Conventions, see Sara Dillon, 
What Human Rights Law Obscures: Global Sex Trafficking and the Demand for Children, 17 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 154 (2008) (“A specialized human rights convention does not in itself 
guarantee substantial change.”). 
86. There is some evidence that in other jurisdictions, parallel rights are being taken seriously. 
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8(1) 
(amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/ 
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In an earlier paper, we considered the few scholarly articles in the 
literature that stand out as rare examples of what scholars should be 
thinking about:87 Maya Sabatello’s paper on the intersection between 
infertility, reproductive technologies, and disability rights law;88 her 
paper on how sexuality was considered in the debate on the CRPD;89 
and, most directly, Marta Schaaf’s article on sexuality in the context of 
the CRPD.90 Drawing on Articles 2 (one of the “reasonable 
accommodation” articles), 23 and 26, Sabatello concludes that the 
CRPD provides a “possible venue to further advance a right to found a 
family through [assisted reproductive technologies].”91 In assessing the 
drafting process, Sabatello notes how all conversations about sexuality 
“raised acute debates,”92 and that, as a result, sexuality per se “was not 
elevated to the status of a right.”93 Schaaf—who frontally notes that 
disabled sexuality is often perceived as a “threat to others”94—discussed 
the “tension” that underlaid the negotiations leading to the adoption of 
the CRPD “between efforts to promote sexual rights and efforts to 
protect [persons with disabilities] from unwanted sterilization.”95 Schaaf 
en/treaties/html/005.htm (as construed in X. v. Iceland, App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 86 (1976)) (article prohibiting public authorities from interfering with a person’s right 
“to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” is broad enough to 
encompass an entitlement “to establish and to develop relationships with other human beings, 
especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfillment of one’s own personality”); 
Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of People with Mental Disabilities: A 
Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. 
REV. 20, 94 (2004). 
87. See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 2. 
88. Maya Sabatello, Who’s Got Parental Rights? The Intersection Between Infertility, 
Reproductive Technologies, and Disability Rights Law, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 227 (2010). 
See generally Stevens, supra note 81, at 16. Another crucial issue in the lives of disabled people is 
the experience of legal intervention to deny parental rights. Denial of parental rights occurs across 
types of disabilities but occurs perhaps most fervently with intellectually and developmentally 
disabled people—as in many cases they lack the autonomy to consent to sexual activity, the choice 
to reproduce, and the ability to retain children after birth. See, e.g., Bethany Stevens, Structural 
Barriers to Sexual Autonomy for Disabled People, 38 HUM. RTS. 14 (2011); Duffy Dillon, Child 
Custody and the Developmentally Disabled Parent, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 127. 
89. Maya Sabatello, Disability, Human Rights and Global Health: Past, Present, Future, in 16 
LAW AND GLOBAL HEALTH CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 244 (M. Freeman et al. eds., 2014) (in press). 
90. Marta Schaaf, Negotiating Sexuality in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 8 SUR INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 113 (2011). 
91. Sabatello, supra note 88, at 259. 
92. Sabatello, supra note 89, at 257. 
93. Id. On the opposition of the Arab Group of nations, the Holy See and Yemen to expanded 
mention of sexuality—unmoored from traditional marriage—see id. 
94. Schaaf, supra note 90, at 114. 
95. Id. at 124. 
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notes that disability-focused NGOs “continue to be reluctant to engage 
sexuality,”96 but she concludes that “sexual rights as a rubric of rights’ 
claiming will likely continue to grow, providing greater and better 
opportunities to move beyond current understandings of sexual 
citizenship to include disabled and all other bodies.”97 
Throughout the CRPD, it is apparent that the preferences and 
decisions of persons with disabilities must be respected and promoted.98 
Expanding on this idea of self-determination, it follows that decisions 
about sex, sexuality and reproduction are to be made by the person with 
a disability, rather than a “caretaker” or a facility superintendent.99 This 
kind of decision-making is a core element of self-determination and 
empowerment. 
3. Therapeutic Jurisprudence100 
Another important lens through which to view this issue is that of 
therapeutic jurisprudence. Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) “asks us to 
look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”101 and focuses on the 
law’s influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.102 It 
suggests that “law should value psychological health, should strive to 
avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and—
when consistent with other values served by law—should attempt to 
bring about healing and wellness.”103 The ultimate aim of TJ is to 
determine whether legal rules and procedures or lawyer roles can or 
should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not 
subordinating due process principles.104 There is an inherent tension in 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 125. 
98. Cf. Bahner, supra note 1, at 338 (discussing Sweden) (“Even though the article 23 covers the 
right to a sexual life, this aspect has not been implemented in personal assistance services.”). 
99. See Judith A. Cook, Sexuality and People with Psychiatric Disabilities, 18 SEXUALITY AND 
DISABILITY 195, 203 (2000). 
100. Portions of this section are adapted from Perlin & Lynch, supra note 2. 
101. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with 
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).  
102. See David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and 
Strategies, in DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A 
HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2000). 
103. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in 
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003). 
104. See Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve 
Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
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this inquiry. David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: 
The law’s use of “mental health information to improve therapeutic 
functioning [cannot] impinge[] upon justice concerns.”105 As one of the 
authors has written elsewhere, “an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes 
does not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil 
liberties.”106 In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance 
rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been described as “a sea-change 
in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more 
distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which 
emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”107 
That is, TJ supports an ethic of care.108 
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.109 
Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs” as voice, validation, and 
voluntariness,110 arguing: 
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must 
REV. 735, 751 (2005); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal 
Profession’s Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 
589, 591 (2008) (discussing how TJ “might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a 
means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist façade’”); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George’s Story: Voice 
and Transformation Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law 
School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599 n.111 (2005); Ian Freckelton, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 
30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–86 (2008). 
105. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal 
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 
5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 184 (1996). 
106. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, 
“Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, 
“Us” and “Them,” 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998). 
107. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. 
& MED. 328, 329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to 
Settlement: Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: 
PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick 
& David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: 
Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2006). The use of the 
phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
108. See, e.g., Winick & Wexler, supra note 107, at 605–07; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party 
Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns About Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Brookbanks, supra 
note 107; Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A “Therapeutic” Approach to 
Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006). 
109. See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 
(2005).  
110. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the 
importance of “voice,” see Freckelton, supra note 104, at 588. 
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have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision 
maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely 
listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the 
litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a 
legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are 
more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a 
sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant 
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the 
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in 
the very process that engendered the end result or the very 
judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate 
healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In 
general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are 
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.111 
The questions that must be addressed here are these: Are persons with 
mental disabilities given this sort of autonomy in their sexual decision 
making? Are Professor Ronner’s “three V’s” complied with? 
While the sexual components of competency are a critical 
consideration, especially for those individuals confined in a psychiatric 
facility, there are a multitude of other issues that involve a presumption 
of competency (or, alternatively, the presumption of incompetency).112 
When the presumption of incompetency exists, so too does the 
possibility for disparate treatment of people—virtually always 
improperly—deemed incompetent. In the following sections, we provide 
examples of contexts in which competency is discussed in statutes or 
case law, and we attempt to make clear where individuals deemed 
incompetent may face discrimination due to their mental disabilities. 
III. MARRIAGE113 
Marriage has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, however, recent 
U.S. Supreme Court, lower federal court, and state court decisions have 
embraced and endorsed the right for broader equality in the right to 
marry.114 These decisions have raised the question of whether “the right 
111. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002) (citations omitted). 
112. Cf. supra note 29 (presumption of incompetency disallowed in the law). 
113. This section is adapted from PERLIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 269–75.  
114. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (federal statute 
defining marriage as solely being between man and woman was unconstitutional as a deprivation of 
the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment). See also, Cass R. Sunstein, The Right 
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to marry” falls under an equal protection or due process argument.115 
Marriage itself is viewed as such an important right in the United States 
that, historically, there has been very little interference allowed by the 
states, although the state may impose reasonable requirements if they 
pose no significant interference with the marital relationship.116 
Substantial interference with the decision to marry is permissible only if 
important state interests are at stake and the regulation is closely tailored 
to effectuate the state’s interests.117 Marriage statutes have typically been 
created using “capacity” as a determinative factor, rather than 
“competency.” Using an analysis of competency leads to a novel 
discussion that, so far, has not taken place in many laws or statutes. 
Historically, consistent with constitutional guarantees, the statutory 
requirements for marriage between a man and woman were generally 
minimal.118 For others not conforming to these statutorily-implemented 
standards, statutory requirements had barred them from marrying.119 
Every marriage requires capacity on the part of both individuals to enter 
into the relationship.120 This stems from the conception of marriage as a 
contract, as well as a social status.121 There is no question that, as 
plaintiffs continue to be successful in same-sex marriage cases, the 
issues that we are discussing in this Article will inevitably emerge in 
such cases as well. 
to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2089 (2005): 
Very oddly, the Turner Court did not specify whether the right to marry is rooted in substantive 
due process (as Loving suggested) or in the fundamental rights branch of equal protection 
doctrine (the most sensible reading of Zablocki). It would be fair to read the Court as treating 
marriage as akin to other privacy rights, in a way that suggests that substantive due process is 
involved. But for purposes of reaching its conclusion, the Court did not have to choose 
between the two possible sources of its decision.  
Id. 
115. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state miscegenation 
statute on both equal protection and due process grounds). 
116. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1978) (invalidating an inmate marriage 
regulation which prohibited inmates from marrying other inmates or civilians unless prison 
superintendent determined that there were compelling reasons because the regulation was not 
reasonably related to any penological objective).  
117. Id.  
118. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.103 (LexisNexis 2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 2.001 (West 2006).  
119. On inability to consent to marriage due to mental incapacity, see, for example, CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 2210(c) (West 2013). 
120. See, e.g., Mahan v. Mahan, 88 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1956).  
121. Edmunds v. Edwards, 287 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Neb. 1980).  
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A. Mental Capacity to Marry 
As in other areas of civil law, individuals are presumed to possess 
capacity in the absence of a determination to the contrary.122 Moreover, 
a presumption of validity applies to marriages, reflecting the state’s 
interest in promoting and protecting marriage and family.123 
The best accepted standard for mental capacity to marry is whether 
the individual understands the nature of the marriage contract and the 
duties and responsibilities it creates.124 The language of this standard 
parallels the capacity standard for ordinary contracts, but the meaning is 
quite different due to the vast differences in the responsibilities and 
consequences of marriage as opposed to those stemming from engaging 
in ordinary business transactions.125 As one court described it: 
[Marriage,] in many cases, depends more on sentiments of 
mutual esteem, attachment, and affection, which the weakest 
may feel as well as the strongest intellects, than on the exercise 
of a clear, unclouded reason, or sound judgment, or intelligent 
discernment and discrimination, and in which it differs in a very 
important respect from all other contracts.126 
Few cases specify what an individual must understand about the 
“nature of marriage” or the attendant “duties and responsibilities” in 
order to satisfy the marriage capacity standard. A contractual perspective 
would suggest that the material provisions of the marriage contract 
would define the understanding required for capacity to marry. Cases 
eschew such a formalistic approach, instead emphasizing the fact-
specific nature of the capacity determination. 
122. Accounts Mgmt. Inc. v. Litchfield, 576 N.W.2d 233, 234 (S.D. 1998) (marriage statute 
should be construed to favor validation even when full compliance with formalities may be 
defective); De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 281 P. 825, 825 (Or. 1929) (presumptive validity of 
marriage). But see Gamez v. Indus. Comm’n, 559 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (marriage 
that fails to comply with statutory requirements is invalid).  
123. Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 169 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ill. 1960); Eygabrood v. Gruis, 79 N.W.2d 
215, 217 (Iowa 1956); Brown v. State, 66 S.E.2d 745, 748 (Ga. 1951).  
124. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hendrickson, 805 P.2d 20, 23 (Kan. 1991); Johnson v. Johnson, 104 
N.W.2d 8, 14 (N.D. 1960); Cook v. Cook, 243 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Ky. 1951).  
125. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 2006) (establishing contractual capacity as 
applicable to marriage). 
126. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d at 14. See also Edmunds v. Edwards, 287 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Neb. 
1980) (“[Marriage] is not a contract resembling in any but the slightest degree, except as to the 
element of consent, any other contract with which the courts have to deal, is apparent upon a 
moment’s reflection. * * * What persons establish by entering into matrimony, is not a contractual 
relation, but a social status; and the only essential features of the transactions are that the 
participants are of legal capacity to assume that status, and freely consent so to do.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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The formalistic approach was explicitly rejected in the case of Ivery v. 
Ivery,127 involving a daughter’s challenge to the marriage of her 
deceased father.128 The jury found that the father lacked capacity to 
marry, and the father’s wife appealed.129 The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina reversed and ordered a new trial on the grounds that the jury 
instructions given by the trial court incorrectly suggested that marriage 
capacity required the ability to understand the applicable intestacy 
statute as well as the revocatory effect of marriage on wills pre-dating 
the marriage.130 In other words, capacity to marry does not necessarily 
require an appreciation of the panoply of property rights of a surviving 
spouse. 
As in the case of other capacity doctrines in the civil law, capacity to 
marry need exist only at the time of marriage.131 Proof of a mental 
disability that ordinarily compromises the capacity to marry will not 
invalidate a marriage entered into during a “lucid interval.”132 This is 
another means by which courts can enforce the policy of preserving 
marriage.133 
B. Context and Standing 
Claims of incapacity to marry arise in three basic contexts: (1) one 
spouse seeks annulment after a period of living with the other spouse as 
a married couple (2) a guardian or family member seeks annulment 
during the lifetime of the spouses; and (3) a guardian or family member 
seeks annulment after the death of one of the spouses. Not all of these 
claims are viable in all jurisdictions. Restrictions on who has standing to 
sue, the time in which the annulment suit must be brought, and the form 
127. 129 S.E.2d 457 (N.C. 1963). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 458.  
130. Id. at 464–65.  
131. Briggs v. Briggs, 325 P.2d 219, 224 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Mahan v. Mahan, 88 So. 2d 
545, 547 (Fla. 1956); DeMedio v. DeMedio, 257 A.2d 290, 298 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969). Several years 
after the DeMedio decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected DeMedio’s conclusion that 
Pennsylvania’s divorce statute prohibits a party from raising equitable defenses to an annulment. 
Diamond v. Diamond, 461 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Pa. 1983). The effect (though not necessarily the 
purpose) of recognizing the availability of equitable defenses to annulment is to support the policy 
of preserving marriage. 
132. Briggs, 325 P.2d at 224. 
133. Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 320 (Ala. 1985) (once established, common law marriage is 
presumed valid and party attacking marriage has burden of proof); In re Estate of Wagner, 893 P.2d 
211, 214 (Idaho 1995) (same); Guzman v. Alvarez, 205 S.W.3d 375, 380 (Tenn. 2006) (ceremonial 
marriage presumed valid).  
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of the suit vary by jurisdiction depending on statutes governing 
marriage, guardianship, and civil procedure as well as common law 
principles of standing, collateral attack of judgments, and other 
doctrines. 
1. Spouse Seeks Annulment 
In general, one spouse may seek annulment of a marriage to the other 
spouse based on incapacity. In a few jurisdictions, however, only the 
spouse alleged to lack capacity may assert the claim; a competent spouse 
who wants to dissolve the marriage must pursue divorce.134 
Historically, annulment did not justify judicial re-arrangement of the 
parties’ property rights because alimony, property division, and 
community property all flowed from marriage.135 Annulment of the 
marriage would void it from inception, leaving no basis upon which to 
order spousal support, alimony, or division of property.136 Early cases 
reflect the advantage that annulment offered to a propertied spouse, as 
compared to divorce, where alimony and property division were 
routine.137 
In Forbis v. Forbis,138 for example, Mrs. Forbis petitioned the court 
for separate maintenance after Mr. Forbis refused to permit her to return 
to their marital home following a stay in an insane asylum (this, by the 
way, was a 1955 case).139 Mr. Forbis responded to the claim by seeking 
134. ALASKA. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.05.031, 13.26.150(e)(8) (2006) (cannot prohibit marriage or 
divorce of a ward; only mentally impaired spouse may seek annulment on grounds of incapacity); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140 (McKinney 1999) (competent spouse cannot seek annulment of 
marriage to a mentally retarded spouse; competent spouse cannot seek annulment of marriage to 
mentally ill spouse after mentally ill spouse’s death); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 128 (West 2001); 
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.130 (West 2005) (marriage voidable only at the election of the 
party under disability). Florida specifically denies the guardian the power to determine whether a 
ward marries, instead requiring court approval. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215(2)(a) (West Supp. 
2007). 
135. Some jurisdictions adhere to the common law rule. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 
1124, 1127 (Nev. 2004), reh’g denied, 2004 Nev. Lexis 115 (Nev. Nov. 9, 2004); Shoustari v. 
Zamani, 574 S.E.2d 314, 315 (Va. Ct. App. 2002). Several jurisdictions, however, have deviated 
from the common law rule in order to provide relief for the spouse requiring permanent 
maintenance (alimony) or property division. See, e.g., White v. White, 323 S.E.2d 521, 522 (S.C. 
1984); Callaway v. Callaway, 739 So. 2d 1134, 1137 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Falk v. Falk, 462 
N.W.2d 547, 549 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990); Ranieri v. Ranieri, 539 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1989), appeal dismissed, Ranieri v. Ranieri, 545 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. 1989). 
136. See supra note 135.  
137. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 138–41. 
138. 274 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). 
139. Id. at 803. 
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annulment on the grounds of Mrs. Forbis’ incapacity to marry.140 After 
observing that the presumption of validity of a marriage is “one of the 
strongest known to the law,” the court affirmed the lower court’s 
judgment awarding separate maintenance to Mrs. Forbis and denying 
Mr. Forbis’ claim for annulment.141 
Before the advent of no-fault divorce, annulment offered potential 
relief for a spouse who had no grounds for divorce but did have grounds 
to assert incapacity. In some cases, nearly a decade or more elapsed 
between the marriage and the application for annulment.142 In these 
cases, the spouse alleged to lack capacity to marry typically suffered 
from a chronic mental illness or other disability that predated the 
marriage.143 Courts usually refused to annul such marriages, invoking 
the lucid interval doctrine to refute the contention that chronic mental 
illness could itself establish incapacity to marry.144 
Today, the availability of no-fault divorce eliminates the motivation 
to use one spouse’s mental illness as a means of annulling the marriage 
where no grounds for divorce exist. The property motive for preferring 
annulment to divorce also has largely disappeared because many 
jurisdictions, recognizing the potential for unfairness, expanded courts’ 
authority to order alimony or property division upon annulment. This 
development has decreased the incentive for a spouse to seek annulment 
rather than divorce.145 
2. Guardian or Family Member Seeks Annulment During Spouses’ 
Lifetime 
In order for a guardian to maintain an action for annulment on behalf 
of the ward, the guardian must have that particular authority, either by 
statute or by court order. Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that 
specifically authorize guardians to petition for annulment on behalf of 
140. Id.  
141. Id. at 806, 809.  
142. DeMedio v. DeMedio, 257 A.2d 290, 292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969); Cook v. Cook, 243 S.W.2d 
900, 901 (Ky. 1951). 
143. See infra text accompanying note 144. 
144. DeMedio, 247 A.2d at 292; see also Larson v. Larson, 192 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1963); Forbis, 274 S.W.2d at 805.  
145. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140, Commentaries C 140:1 (McKinney 1999) 
(“reasonable explanation” for the drop in annulments is that it is easier to plead and obtain divorce). 
See generally David B. Perlmutter, Annotation, Incapacity for Sexual Intercourse as Ground for 
Annulment, 52 A.L.R.3d 589 (1973); Kerry Abrams, The End of Annulment, 16 J. GEND. RACE & 
JUST. 681 (2013). 
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their wards.146 In most other jurisdictions, courts have concluded that the 
guardian’s general authority includes the power to seek annulment on 
behalf of the ward.147 
In a few cases, courts have based their decisions about a guardian’s 
authority over a ward’s marriage on their guardianship statutes’ 
provision governing the effect of guardianship on contracts.148 Under 
this analysis, a marriage, like any other contract executed after authority 
over the subject matter of the contract has been transferred from ward to 
guardian, is void. Without a specific reference to marriage in the 
guardianship statute, “contracts” could be interpreted more narrowly, 
applying only to ordinary business contracts. The difference between the 
capacity required for ordinary contracts and the capacity required for 
marriage would seem to justify the more restrictive interpretation of the 
statutory consequences of guardianship. Another factor weighing in 
favor of the narrower statutory interpretation, consistent with the ward’s 
protection, is the policy favoring the least restrictive limitations on a 
ward’s autonomy.149 
Courts have not missed these points; instead they have focused on 
protection of the ward. This approach is understandable in the context of 
Knight v. Radmoski,150 a case that involved the marriage of an 
institutionalized, severely brain-damaged young man to his treating 
psychologist.151 The psychologist sought, but did not receive, the 
approval of her fiancé’s father for the marriage.152 The father, who had 
previously been appointed conservator of his son’s estate, had further 
sought appointment as guardian.153 On the same day the guardianship 
was approved, the son married the psychologist, and the two left the 
146. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-3-2 
(1999); TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 6.108(a) (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20–2–101(d) (West 
2013). 
147. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Drews, 503 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. 1986), cert denied and appeal 
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987); Nave v. Nave, 173 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), 
appeal denied, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 904 (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2005); Krukowsky v. Krukowsky, 49 Pa. D 
& C.2d 651, 653 (1970). See generally David E. Rigney, Annotation, Power of Incompetent 
Spouse’s Guardian or Representative to Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or Annulment of 
Marriage, or to Make Compromise or Settlement in Such Suit, 32 A.L.R. 5th 673 (1995). 
148. Knight v. Radomski, 414 A.2d 1211, 1215–16 (Me. 1980); In re Matter of Johnson, 658 
N.Y.S.2d 780, 784–85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
149. See PERLIN ET AL., supra note 20, ch. 5 D.2.  
150. 414 A.2d 1211 (Me. 1980). 
151. Id. at 1212–13. 
152. Id. at 1216. 
153. Id. at 1212. 
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Maine institution to live in Colorado.154 Noting the severe harm that the 
marriage and the move had caused the ward, the court held that a 
guardian’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to marriage and that 
marriage without consent is voidable. On this theory the guardian had 
standing to seek annulment, which the court granted.155 
3. Guardian or Family Member Seeks Annulment After Death of a 
Spouse 
After the death of either party to the marriage, annulment may be 
unavailable. Traditional legal theory distinguishes between “void” and 
merely “voidable” marriages. The theory allows suits after the death of a 
spouse if the marriage was void, but not if it was merely voidable.156 At 
common law, mental incapacity resulted in a void marriage, as did 
bigamy, incest and other fundamental violations of public policy.157 Less 
serious defects in a marriage, such as fraud, resulted in the marriage 
being merely voidable.158 
Today, several jurisdictions classify a marriage involving a spouse 
who lacked capacity to marry as voidable rather than void. Following the 
common law distinction between void and voidable transactions, 
classification of a transaction as voidable causes the action to abate after 
the death of either of the spouses.159 Some states specify by statute when 
and whether an annulment action abates.160 Where statutes do not 
154. Id. at 1212–13. 
155. Id. at 1216. 
156. In re Santolino, 895 A.2d 506, 509–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005) (discussing history of 
void versus voidable distinction as applied to marriage annulment after the death of a spouse, and 
concluding that the prevailing rule continues to provide that a void marriage may be annulled after 
the death of one of the parties absent a statutory to the contrary).  
157. See generally Annotation, Marriage of Mental Incompetent as Void or Voidable, L.R.A. 
1916C, at 700 (1919), cited in Terry L. Turnipseed, How Do I Love Thee, Let Me Count the Days: 
Deathbed Marriages in America, 96 KY. L.J. 275, 281 n.38 (2007–08).  
158. See, e.g., Dandy v. Dandy, 234 So.2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).  
159. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, 151 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Wis. 1967) (for voidable marriage, 
action abates upon death of a party); Nunley v. Nunley, 210 A.2d 12, 14 (D.C. 1965) (same).  
160. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2250 (West 2014); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1506(b) (West 1975) (after 
death action permissible only if brought by either putative spouse or the legal representative of the 
alleged incapacitated party not more than 90 days after the petitioner learned of the incapacity); 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/302(b)(1) (West 1999) (same as Delaware); MONT. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-
402(2) (West 2005) (action must be brought within one year of petitioner’s knowledge of impaired 
party’s condition); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c) (McKinney 2014) (after death action permissible 
on the basis of mental illness if brought by an interested relative but not if brought by next friend); 
OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.32(c) (Page 2003) (action for annulment abates upon death of either party); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-3-2 (2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.111 (West 2013) (after death 
proceeding for idiot permissible during either party’s lifetime; for lunatics (all those of unsound 
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specifically address the right to pursue annulment after the death of a 
party, a court may interpret other provisions of the statute governing 
annulments to prohibit such an action. 
4. “Heartbalm Actions” 
What about “heartbalm actions”? Beginning in the early 1900s, courts 
became increasingly disinclined to permit recovery in tort for claims that 
emerged out of “tender matters of romantic or sexual emotion.”161 
Claims such as alienation of affection, breach of promise, or criminal 
conversation fell into disfavor under the weight of criticism that such 
claims were “anachronistic,” resulted in excessive and unwarranted 
damage verdicts, and were used to extort or blackmail a marriage that 
was no longer wanted.162 Underlying much of the criticism was also the 
implicit belief that community mores had changed.163 Thus, for example, 
a failure to progress from engagement to marriage no longer carried the 
stigma that previously may have warranted a breach of promise action. 
As a result, a number of states enacted what are commonly referred to as 
“anti-heartbalm statutes,” which bar breach of promise and related 
actions and abolish the old common law claims.164 Interestingly,  
the arguments that fueled the movement to abandon heartbalm 
torts were hardly consistent with the view that women were 
independent, competent people who did not need the law’s 
protection. Instead, the main arguments in support of the anti-
heartbalm movement centered on women’s alleged misuse of the 
torts to extort money from men, with newspaper articles calling 
plaintiffs in these cases “gold-diggers” and “blackmailers” who 
used the heartbalm torts as tools for extortion.165 
Many laws surrounding marriage and divorce may appear 
paternalistic or stigmatizing, both to persons with mental disabilities and 
mind except idiots)); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-111(2)(a) (West 2014). See also In re Estate 
of Fuller, 862 P.2d 1037, 1038–39 (Colo. App. 1993) (holding that marriage could not be annulled 
after death of one of allegedly incapacitated spouses because marriage was voidable rather than 
void).  
161. See, e.g., Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 
‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 381–412 (1993). 
162. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Kobar, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1770, 
1770, 1775–78 (1985). 
163. See, e.g., Jill Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father’s Right to Pursue a Claim of 
Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1066 (2005). 
164. Id. at 1066–70. 
165. Deana Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 789 n.116 (2007). 
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to women in general. The clear distinction between the two groups, 
which is acknowledged in the law, creates inequality and furthers 
stereotypes about the marginalized groups, painting them as incompetent 
in matters involving their personal decisions. 
IV. STERILIZATION 
Our legal system further marginalized the rights of persons with 
mental disabilities by creating laws allowing for forced sterilization of 
“defective” individuals.166 The choice to reproduce was taken away from 
anyone whose genetics could lead to a socially undesirable child being 
born.167 Cases such as Buck v. Bell168 reinforced the acceptability of the 
eugenics movement, and further segregated the population of persons 
with mental disabilities. 
A. Buck v. Bell 
In 1927, in the course of a Supreme Court decision permitting the 
forced sterilization of a woman with a mental disability, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote famously, “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough.”169 Fifty years later, the Court issued a series of decisions 
related to mental disability law, and legal scholars began examining 
previous decisions more carefully.170 In 1976, Robert Burgdorf 
compared Buck v. Bell to the “philosophical premises underlying Nazi 
atrocities.”171 After this scathing analysis of the decision, more scholars 
and critics came forward, agreeing with Burgdorf that this decision was 
“an embarrassing example of bad law.”172 It became clear that forced 
sterilization was no longer supported in the academic legal community. 
The most important development in this area in recent years has been 
the publication of Professor Paul Lombardo’s brilliant book, Three 
Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. 
166. See Karl A. Menninger, Proof of Qualification for Sterilization of a Person with a Mental 
Disability, 49 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 101, § 1 (2014). 
167. See, e.g., Steven S. Spitz, The Norplant Debate: Birth Control or Woman Control?, 25 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 131, 135–36 (1993). 
168. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
169. Id. at 207.  
170. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 547. 
171. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. & Marcia Pearce Burgdorf, Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. 
Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L. Q. 995, 996 (1976). 
172. See, e.g., PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008). 
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Bell.173 Three Generations, finally and definitely, utterly discredits 
Justice Holmes’ “chilling epigram”174 in his infamous “three 
generations” opinion.175 Professor Lombardo’s work and other research 
of the past thirty years all demonstrate the utter lack of scientific basis 
for the conclusion that either Carrie Buck or any of her succeeding 
generations were “mentally defective” or “imbeciles.”176 
B. Misapplication of “Best Interests” Standard 
The jurisprudence on sterilization in the United States, Australia, 
England, and Canada makes clear that decisions are “routinely made on 
behalf of girls and women with disabilities by their parents and care-
givers, ostensibly in their ‘best interests,’ without considering whether 
informed consent can be obtained.”177 In the United States, several 
courts have weighed state constitutional provisions along with their 
federal counterparts in cases involving petitions for involuntary 
sterilization of minors or incompetent persons, and have found both the 
right to be sterilized and the right to autonomy in sterilization decision 
making to be protected by such provisions.178 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, first recognized that, 
although a right to sterilization had not received express constitutional 
protection from the United States Supreme Court, several lower courts 
had found such a right. Drawing on its decision in In re Quinlan,179 the 
right to be sterilized was included in the privacy rights afforded by the 
173. Id. 
174. Perlin, supra note 9, at 539. 
175. There are political implications of sterilization decision making as well. See, e.g., Yee-Fui 
Ng, Disability Rights v. Quality Birth Rhetoric: The Construction of Disability in China, LAWASIA 
J. 1, 1–2 (2012) (discussing implications of China’s policy of “quality births,” leading to the 
sterilization of couples with mental disabilities); Werner, supra note 3, at 16–17 (discussing 
sociopolitical implications of sterilization decision making in Taiwan); Y.C. Chou & Z.Y. Lu, 
Deciding About Sterilization: Perspectives from Women with an Intellectual Disability and Their 
Families in Taiwan, 55 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 63, 64 (2011) (same). 
176. See, e.g., Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: “Felt Necessities” v. Fundamental Values?, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1455 (1981); Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 CONST. 
COMMENT. 331, 334 (1985). 
177. Willene Holness, Informed Consent for Sterilisation of Women and Girls with Disabilities in 
the Light of the Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities, 27 AGENDA 35, 46 (2013). 
178. For a comparative perspective, see generally L. Servais et al., Sterilisation of Intellectually 
Disabled Women, 19 EUROPEAN PSYCHIATRY 428 (2004) (discussing high rate of sterilization of 
such women in Belgium, and noting the correlation between sterilization rates and institutional 
residence). 
179. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
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federal Constitution.180 Beyond this basis, the court specifically found 
that the right was also protected by the state constitution, and that “[the] 
governmental intrusion into privacy rights may require more persuasive 
showing of a public interest under our State Constitution than under the 
federal Constitution.”181 
In one case, the California Supreme Court found that state legislation 
that absolutely forbade sterilization of persons under conservatorship 
deprived persons with developmental disabilities of their privacy rights 
under the state and federal constitutions.182 The court also found the 
right of a woman “to choose whether or not to bear a child and thus to 
control her social role and personal destiny” was a fundamental right 
under the same state constitutional provision, which could be restricted 
only by a compelling state interest.183 
Other cases have discussed the legality of whether a circuit court can 
rule on the petition of a guardian seeking to have an adult with mental 
retardation sterilized.184 By way of example, In re Matter of Susan S.185 
found that a trial court of general jurisdiction had, pursuant to state a 
constitution, broad parens patriae power over incompetent persons, 
enabling that court to act on a petition seeking sterilization.186 On the 
other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court held that there was no clear and 
convincing evidence to show that a woman with mental disabilities was 
unable to grant or withhold consent to sterilization, and the state 
constitutional law issue was thus not reached.187 In a later case, the 
Eighth Circuit found that, if proven, the allegations that state social 
service workers had compelled a mildly retarded woman to submit to a 
tubal ligation rose to the level of a due process violation.188 
Sterilization, in some cases, may even be a “bargaining chip” as part 
of a plea arrangement. In a Louisiana decision, seventy-eight year-old 
Frank Tullier agreed to carry out his surgical castration that was part of 
an earlier plea deal for eventual release back to the community.189 In the 
180. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981). 
181. Id. 
182. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985). 
183. Id. at 774. 
184. In re Susan S., No. 7764, 1996 WL 75343 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1996). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at *6. 
187. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 823–24 (Colo. 1990). 
188. Vaughn v. Ruoff, 304 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2002). 
189. Campbell Robertson, Child Molester Is Castrated in Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at 
A16; Lystra Batchoo, Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex Offenders: Waiving the Eighth 
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decision discussing Tullier’s release, the trial judge in that case 
mandated that it was “time to give Caesar what is owed Caesar.”190 
Professor Heather Ellis Cucolo has discussed the “sanitization of sex” 
among the cohort of offenders in civil commitment settings.191 In 
addition to sterilization, there has been a recent increase in the 
recommendation of chemical castration in sex offender cases.192 She 
observes that we sanitize through administering drugs to chemically 
castrate individuals, as well as performing actual castration.193 Although 
consent issues rarely arise in these cases, the question of duress needs to 
be considered when offenders are told that these medications and 
procedures are their only hope for freedom and eventual release to the 
community. Even with castration, offenders are often still not viewed as 
candidates for release.194 
The fear of individuals with mental disabilities who have committed 
sex offenses is twofold: not only have they committed a particularly 
taboo offense, but there is the stigma and perception by society that, 
because of a mental illness, they are particularly sexually dangerous. 
Even the “sanitization” of their “out-of-control” sexual urges does not 
allow for their release. In an earlier article, one of the authors focused on 
how our fears of this population—fears stoked by, 
the impact of media distortions on legislative policies, the lack 
of a factual basis for the public’s obsessive fears (fears based on 
‘biased recall and unrealistic crime stereotypes’), the ways that 
such media distortion and public pressures affect judicial 
decision-making – [doom us] to endlessly play out a 
‘pathological’ morality drama[,] . . . in spite of the 
overwhelming empirical evidence that shows that the laws in 
question have little or no effect on sexual offending rates and 
Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 689, 691–92 
(2007). 
190. See Robertson, supra note 189.  
191. Heather Ellis Cucolo, Right to Sex in the Treatment and Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators 41 (July 2007) (paper presented to the International Academy of Law and Mental 
Health Biennial Congress, Padua, Italy) (on file with authors). 
192. John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, The Eighth 
Amendment and Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 577 (2006). 
193. See Michael L. Perlin, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the 
Competence to Have Sex 38 (Apr. 2011) (paper presented to the Rocky Mountain Psychological 
Association), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1908733.  
194. Linda E. Weinberger, Shoba Sreenivasan, Thomas Garrick & Hadley Osran, The Impact of 
Surgical Castration on Sexual Recidivism Risk Among Sexually Violent Predatory Offenders, 33 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 16, 30 (2005). 
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recidivism.195 
These fears and this “morality drama” affect and infect all of the 
permutations of what we are discussing here. 
V. STATUTORY RAPE 
It is important to note that the case law and the theory that developed 
around issues of marriage, divorce, and sterilization have developed 
totally independent from the case law and theory that emerged in the 
area of statutory rape. A review of the relevant statutes and the case law 
reveals that not a single legislative committee that drafted any of these 
laws or the majority of a single appellate court that decided any of these 
cases ever gave the slightest thought to the issues that should be at the 
core of these inquiries. Only two concurring opinions in two obscure 
state cases even “get” any of the key issues.196 We now address these 
issues. 
A. Statutory Law 
A typical statute is that of Alaska: it is sexual assault in the third 
degree to engage in sexual contact with a person that the offender knows 
is “incapacitated” or “mentally incapable.”197 Under state law, 
“incapacitated” means “temporarily incapable of appraising the nature of 
one’s own conduct or physically unable to express unwillingness to 
act”198 (sounding as if meaning to describe someone who is seriously 
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs), and “mentally incapable” 
means “suffering from a mental disease or defect that renders the person 
incapable of understanding the nature or consequences of the person’s 
conduct, including the potential for harm to that person.”199 In 
Alabama’s similar statute, “mentally defective” is defined as meaning 
195. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “They’re Planting Stories In the Press”: The 
Impact of Media Distortions on Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 222 
(2013) (footnotes omitted); see also Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-
Offender Recidivism Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community 
Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
196. For an article urging legislators to modify the ways that defendants with mental retardation 
may be charged with statutory rape, see Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders, Incomprehensible Crimes: 
Defendants with Mental Retardation Charged with Statutory Rape, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (2010). 
See generally infra text accompanying notes 218–21.  
197. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.425(a)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2014). 
198. Id. § 11.41.470(2). 
199. Id. § 11.41.470(4) (emphasis added). North Dakota’s language is almost identical. See N. D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(e) (West 2014). 
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that “a person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him 
incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct.”200 The New York 
laws are virtually identical.201 
Arizona defines the term with a bit more detail: 
The victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, 
mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other similar 
impairment of cognition and such condition is known or should 
have reasonably been known to the defendant. For purposes of 
this subdivision, “mental defect” means the victim is unable to 
comprehend the distinctively sexual nature of the conduct or is 
incapable of understanding or exercising the right to refuse to 
engage in the conduct with another.202 
B. The Case Law 
An examination of the pertinent case law suggests that judges devote 
very little hard thought to the questions posed by these cases. 
Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, the issue that emerges multiple 
times is a pair of evidentiary questions: what are the qualifications of an 
expert who testifies as to the victim’s ability to consent, and when is 
such expert testimony needed at all? Most of the reported cases that look 
at the issues in any depth at all focus on this question. In a search of 
dozens of cases related to this subject, we found only two opinions, both 
concurrences, which seem to actually comprehend the scope of the 
issues involved.203 The cases that discussed these issues at all also 
seemed to deal with victims who were developmentally disabled, rather 
than mentally ill. 
First, though, consider a 1950 case from Alabama: Stephenson v. 
State.204 Stephenson involved a case of sexual intercourse with a twenty-
seven year-old woman who became pregnant as a result of the rape 
(stunningly, named in the opinion).205 After noting that it was “lack of 
mental capacity, and not lack of moral quality and strength,”206 here’s 
how the appellate court constructed the issue: 
200. ALASKA CODE ANN. § 13A-6-60(5) (LexisNexis 2014). 
201. MCKINNEY’S PENAL LAW §§ 130.30(2), 130.00(5). 
202. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-1401(5)(b) (West 2014). 
203. See State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 116 (Idaho 1990); State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 831 
(N.D. 1986) discussed infra text accompanying notes 210–11 & 220–22. 
204. 48 So. 2d 255 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950). 
205. Id. at 255. 
206. Id. at 256.  
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We know and hear of people whose mental powers to perceive 
and grasp are impaired along certain avenues of thought and yet 
whose perception is fairly normal in other respects. Lunacy 
implies a weakness or perversion of the mind, but not 
necessarily its destruction. Idiocy, even, is generally accepted to 
consist in only a defect or sterility of the intellectual powers. 
The degree, of course, varies.207 
Mercifully, the modern cases mostly eschew this level of discourse. 
Again, the bulk of the cases deal with issues of expertise, and all 
eventually affirmed convictions. A Washington case—after opining that 
“it has not even been shown that the psychological and psychiatric 
community is prepared to express an opinion on the issue [of whether 
expert testimony is necessary to establish incapacity]”208—found that 
there was no reason to require expert testimony at all: 
Evidence which establishes a rape victim’s inability to 
understand the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse is 
not the kind of technical evidence which requires medical 
testimony to decipher. Unlike evidence of command delusions, 
or medical malpractice, or the functions of computers, a witness’ 
comprehension of the basic consequences of his or her actions 
can be proved or disproved from his or her testimony and 
testimony as to behavior.209 
There is no citation to any authority for this proposition. 
A North Dakota case affirmed a conviction in which a social worker 
testified that the complainant was “‘a child in a woman’s body, and 
that . . . [s]he is not capable [of giving consent], [as she] would not 
understand all of the social implications of this relationship,’”210 
although it noted that “expert medical testimony would have established 
a stronger case.”211 A North Carolina case affirmed a conviction based 
on testimony of the victim’s father that the complainant was “‘very 
limited . . . as far as being an adult’” and was “‘very easily 
sidetracked.’”212 A Massachusetts case affirmed a conviction in which a 
Division of Mental Retardation caseworker testified that the complainant 
“had the mental capacity of a nine year old child,” without any predicate 
207. Id. at 258 (emphasis added). 
208. State v. Summers, 70 Wash. App. 424, 428, 853 P.2d 953, 956 (1993). 
209. Id. 
210. State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 830 (N.D. 1986). 
211. Id. 
212. State v. Holley, 616 S.E.2d 30, No. COA04-1314, 2005 WL 1805036, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. 
Aug. 2, 2005). 
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evidence of any testing ever having been done on her, concluding further 
that the question of consent “did not require any expert testimony 
concerning the specific etiology of any limitations relevant to her 
consent.”213 And a Utah case affirmed a conviction based on the 
testimony of a “mental retardation professional” who was not licensed to 
diagnose mental retardation, reasoning that licensing was not 
“dispositive” of the expert’s qualifications to offer an opinion on the 
victim’s “ability to consent to a sexual relationship.”214 
Other cases fail to consider the ambiguities and difficulties presented 
by the operative statutes. An Indiana case, by way of example, found, 
tautologically, that the “plain and ordinary meaning” of “‘mentally 
disabled or deficient’” in the state law was “subnormal intelligence or 
mental disease or defect.”215 A Washington case notes, without irony, 
that the complainant (whom the court found incompetent to consent to 
having sex) was married at the time.216 By way of contrast, a Georgia 
case specifically found that the fact that the victim had never been found 
to be legally incompetent did not mandate a conclusion that she was 
competent to engage in sexual activity.217 An Arizona case also 
considers whether the woman had “the capacity to understand the nature 
of her conduct,”218 but fails to ever explicate what this means (that she 
might have a baby? That she might “feel good”? That she might have 
remorse?). The most bizarre of this set is an appellate case from 
California in which the court affirmed a conviction where the 
complainant was never sworn in as a witness but was permitted to 
answer questions—as to her age, her name, the spelling of her name—so 
that the fact-finders could “‘observe her behavior, her demeanor, [and] 
her actions.’”219 
Concurrences in two other cases demonstrate some grasp of the 
nuances of this difficult area of the law. In an Idaho case affirming a 
conviction (another case involving a married complainant), the majority 
quoted at length and with approval the trial court’s observations that her 
213. Commonwealth v. Fuller, 845 N.E.2d 434, 439 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
214. State v. Kelley, 1 P.3d 546, 550 (Utah 2000). 
215. Douglas v. State, 484 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
216. State v. Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wash. 2d 702, 705, 881 P.2d 231, 239 (1994). Interestingly, 
this case otherwise carefully focuses on the difference between individuals who “may have a 
condition which permits them to have a knowledge of the basic mechanics of sexual intercourse, but 
no real understanding of either the encompassing nature of sexual intercourse or the consequences 
which may follow.” Id. at 712, 881 P.2d at 237. 
217. Melton v. State, 639 S.E.2d 411, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
218. State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 81, 84 (Ariz. 1987). 
219. People v. Morgan, 236 Cal. Rptr. 186, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
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answers to questions were “slow and short,” and that her facial 
expression consisted of a “‘sagging jaw, mouth open.’”220 Retorted the 
concurring opinion: 
I do not understand why the majority takes the time to relate 
anecdotal evidence of the victim’s appearance in court in order 
to support the district court’s determination that the victim could 
not legally consent . . . . If I did not know better, I would have 
thought that the day was long gone when a person’s intelligence 
was judged by a person’s appearance.221 
In affirming the conviction, the majority had also gone out of its way 
to distinguish sex-within-marriage from sex-outside-of-marriage, 
pontificating that “non-marital sexual relations . . . are not considered by 
society in a favorable light . . . because of the difficult consequences that 
may follow.”222 
In another North Dakota case that affirmed a conviction, the 
concurring judges focused on the state’s developmental disabilities 
rights law (the only such consideration of the rights of persons with 
disabilities in this entire universe of case law), noting: 
It is well to bear in mind that there is no presumption of 
incompetence simply because a developmentally disabled 
person is receiving special services or living at a residence for 
the developmentally disabled [citing state law]. Nor is a 
developmentally disabled person deprived of the right to 
“interact” with members of the opposite sex. [citing state law]. I 
believe the State should, in cases like the instant one, present 
testimony of a medical expert on the subject of mental defect or 
mental disease and its effect on a particular individual’s 
comprehension. The jury is entitled to at least that much, if not 
more assistance in reaching a verdict.223 
Again, every one of these cases deals with an individual with a 
developmental or intellectual disability. The only on-point case 
involving a complainant with a mental illness was a Michigan appeal, in 
which the court rejected the defendant’s argument that “a psychological 
expert or an in-depth examination of the [defendant’s] mental health 
records would have been helpful,” noting cursorily that “[i]t was 
established that [the] complainant was schizophrenic,” and that, in 
220. State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 115 (Idaho 1990). 
221. Id. at 116 (Bistline, J., specially concurring). 
222. Id. at 114 (majority opinion). 
223. State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 831 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., specially concurring). 
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conclusion, “there was nothing to suggest that more authoritative 
impeachment by an expert would have been of significant value.”224 
Interestingly, there has been some recent excellent and thoughtful 
scholarship on the global issues related to statutory rape, some 
arguing—in the context of consensual teenage sex225—that criminal 
penalties rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.226 Yet, this has had virtually no impact on the case 
law in this area as it reflects the ongoing infantilization of women with 
mental disabilities.227 
VI. OTHER APPROACHES: THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT228 
Some fifteen years ago, one of the authors speculated about the 
potential impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on questions of 
patient sexuality. “Can hospital procedures—either written or 
unwritten—that prohibit all patients from meaningful, voluntary sexual 
interaction survive ADA-based challenges?”229 Congress’s ADA 
findings specifically acknowledged how “overprotective rules and 
policies” discriminate invidiously against persons with mental 
disabilities.230 Certainly, many of the institutional rules banning sexual 
224. People v. Campbell, No. 280424, 2008 WL 4958856, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2008). 
225. Beyond the scope of this Article are issues that arise in cases involving teenage “sexting” 
(mailing or posting sexually explicit photographs of oneself). See generally JoAnne Sweeny, 
Sexting and Freedom of Expression: A Comparison Approach, 102 KY. L.J. 103 (2013–2014); 
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stimson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive 
Law, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5 (2013); Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Exploring the First Amendment 
Rights of Teens in Relationship to Sexting and Censorship, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 315 (2012). In 
general, see Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1203, 1208 
(1998) (“Sex offenders do not share a common set of psychological and behavioral 
characteristics.”). 
226. See, e.g., Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 722–23, 742 (2008). For 
an inquiry into limitations on girls’ capacity for autonomy and consent in sexual interactions, see 
Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 8 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 109 (2004). 
227. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 9, at 537; Perlin, supra note 82, at 969; Benedet & Grant, supra 
note 9, at 521–24; Sabatello, supra note 88, at 234 (“[W]omen with disabilities have often wrongly 
and unfairly been seen as asexual objects, persons without ‘normal’ familial and sexual needs, or a 
mere burden on society.”). 
228. On this question, see Perlin, supra note 82. 
229. Id. at 967. 
230. On the ADA in the context of mental disability in general, see 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 5A-2 et seq., at 145–222 (2d ed. 2002); 
MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
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contact flow from this discriminatory notion of over-protectionism. 
The ADA’s legislative history—as it applied to persons with mental 
disability—did focus specifically on questions of stereotyping and 
“reflects Congressional awareness of the pernicious danger of 
stereotyping behavior.”231 It is likely that these policies flowed, in large 
part, from two contradictory stereotypes: one of infantilization (denying 
the reality that institutionalized persons with disabilities may retain the 
same sort of sexual urges, desires, and needs the rest of us have and 
generally upon which the rest of us act) and, paradoxically, one of 
demonization (expressing fear of their hypersexuality and the correlative 
need of protections and limitations to best stop them from acting on 
these primitive urges). How can these stereotypes be reconciled with the 
legislative history just considered? 
To what extent do the courts see sex as a fundamental right?232 
Although the Supreme Court has never found sexual interaction per se to 
be a specifically protected right, it has found a fundamental right to 
privacy in a broad array of cases involving reproductive choice,233 
contraception,234 marriage,235 and family relationships,236 and has 
recognized a fundamental right to be free, “except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s 
privacy.”237 In the course of an opinion holding that a state may not 
condition the right to appeal from a decision terminating a parent’s 
rights on his or her ability to pay certain filing fees,238 the Court stressed 
that “[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of 
children are among associational rights [that it] has ranked as ‘of basic 
§§ 5A-2 et seq., at 14–101 (2013 Cum. Supp.). 
231. Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be 
Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 25 (1993–94). On sexual stereotyping of women with mental 
disabilities, see generally Benedet & Grant, supra note 9. 
232. On the significance of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring unconstitutional 
state law criminalizing consensual sodomy), see Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, “Friend to 
the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame”: Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation 
19–23 (Jan. 17, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2380701.  
233. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
234. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
235. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
236. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
237. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). For a list of all areas in which the Court has 
recognized fundamental rights involving family life and personal autonomy (which may include 
sexual privacy), see Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 482–83 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
238. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996). 
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importance in our society,’”239 citing to, inter alia, Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson,240 a 1942 case finding a right to procreation.241 
There is, in short, no compelling state interest to support a policy 
banning all voluntary sexual interaction in hospital facilities. Any 
presumption of incompetence that may be relied upon—either explicitly 
or implicitly—to support such a blanket proscription also fails to pass 
any sort of heightened scrutiny analysis, especially in light of the 
fundamentality of sexual experience as a constitutionally protected 
privacy right. This is not to suggest, of course, that hospital facilities are 
not free to impose reasonable restrictions on inpatient sexual activity. 
For a variety of clinical, administrative, and public safety reasons, 
carefully drawn limitations will pass ADA muster, as long as these 
policies are not based on stereotypes, allow for individualized decision 
making in individual cases, and authentically reflect a compelling state 
interest. 
What has happened since the publication of the “Make Promises by 
the Hour” article in 1997 discussing the ADA and sexual autonomy?242 
The ADA has been invoked in a wide range of cases involving just about 
every aspect of family law and domestic relations: marriage, divorce, 
child custody, child dependency, and foster care. Although there is one 
case that considers these issues in the sterilization context—in Lake v. 
Arnold,243 the Third Circuit found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of 
action in case alleging that nonconsensual sterilization violated ADA—
by and large, the specific questions that are raised in this Article have 
not yet been addressed with any clarity or definitiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the issues discussed in this Article must be considered 
through multiple filters: through the filter of sanism, through the filter of 
international human rights, and through the filter of domestic anti-
discrimination law. Each of these considerations must be contextualized 
with society’s attitudes toward sexuality in general, and specifically, the 
bundle of attitudes that comes into play when we think of sexuality and 
persons with disabilities, and especially when that sexuality is not 
simply “vanilla” male-female intercourse. Our prejudices, our fears—
239. Id. at 116. 
240. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
241. Id. 
242. See Perlin, supra note 82.  
243. 112 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 1997).  
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both spoken and unspoken—dominate the discourse (or, often, the lack 
of discourse) in this area of law and policy, and it is essential we 
confront this as we approach these issues. 
These are our conclusions: 
First, there is no unitary definition of competency in this area. Often, 
there are no definitions, and when definitions exist, they are often 
circular and contradictory. 
Second, there is a whole range of issues to be considered in 
determining “sexual competency,” but, as the cases we have discussed 
should make clear, these factors change from case to case, jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and substantive topic to substantive topic. However, where 
policies exist, they are often stigmatizing and marginalizing, and do not 
allow for the range of opportunities to engage in sexual activities 
afforded to those without mental disabilities. 
Third, these substantive topics and the detrimental laws that do exist 
remain so under-discussed because we are still so astonishingly 
uncomfortable thinking about the questions at hand. We want to close 
our eyes to the reality that persons with mental disabilities are sexual 
beings, and want to close our eyes even more to the fact that their 
sexuality may be much more like “ours” than it is different. 
Fourth, our current policies fly totally in the face of the “three V’s” 
that Professor Amy Ronner articulated as the heart of therapeutic 
jurisprudence: voice, validation and voluntariness.244 They also are 
inconsistent with international human rights conventions, and perpetuate 
sanism. 
Bob Dylan wrote, in Desolation Row, about the “sexless patients.”245 
Society wishes patients were sexless. They are not, and we need to deal 
with that reality. Notwithstanding the sexual revolution, the civil rights 
revolution, the gender-role revolution, the patients’ rights revolution, 
and the human rights revolution, we remain moored in attitudes and 
prejudices of the past century (and, perhaps, the century before that) 
when we think about the issues addressed here. When the authors 
discuss them with friends and work colleagues, the responses, 
predictably, include embarrassment, titters, bad jokes, and a general 
sense of discomfort. We hope that, by writing this Article (and others 
dealing with similar issues),246 we can alter these predictable responses, 
and finally devote to this area of law and policy the attention it deserves. 
244. Ronner, supra note 110, at 627. 
245. Dylan, supra note 16. 
246. See, e.g., Perlin & Lynch, supra note 2. 
 
                                                     
